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Plaintiffs and Res.pondents,
vs.
EDWARD L. GffiLD and MABEL
C. GUILD, Husband and Wife,
D~fendants and Appellants

Appeal From Third District Court, S·alt Lake' County
Hon. Oscar W. Mceonkie, Judge

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
J.D. SKEEN,
. ·E. J. SKEEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
·.and Appellants.
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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
JOHN CHRISTY and KATHRYN
E. CHRISTY, Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
EDWARD L. GUILD and MABEL
C. GUILD, Husband and Wife,
Defendants and Appellanbs

Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County
Hon. Oscar W- McConkie, Judge

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATE~IENT

This is
scribed
visions
alleged
day of

a suit for restitution of the premises dein the complaint, brought under the proof the unla\vfnl detainer statute. It is
in the com·plaint that on or about the 24th
January, 1935 the plaintiffs ngreed to sel1
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to the defendants certain real estate particularly
described, for the sum of $3200. Among. other
things the contract provided that the defendants
were to build certain improvements consisting of
a front porch built out of firebrick on a concrete
foundation and the remodeling of the rear by a.ppli
cation of plaster and California stucco. The contract provided for $30 monthly payments and it \vas
alleged that the defendants have failed to make the
monthly payments and that on the 30th day of
April, 1940 the defendants were delinquent on
account of monthly p~ayments in the sum of ·$130
and were delinquent in the payment of taxes and
insurance, aggregating $297.20.
It was alleged that although on April 30, 1940 the
plaintiffs caused to be served on the defendants a
notice in writing terminating the contract and had
on May 6, 1940 served on the defendants a notice
demanding delivery of the premises to the plaintiffs, the defendants had nevertheless failed and
refused to deliver possession. The prayer was
for restitution of the premises and damages for
the rents and profits at the rate of $75~00 per
month. The complaint was amended by attaching
the sales agreement, Exhibit A, in evidence. (Ab.
1-8).
The defendants answered, admitting the execution
and delivery of the contract of sale described, admitting that they had ·agreed to make certain improvements and alleging that the defendants had
made improvements on the property to the approximate cost and value of $2,000~ and that the plaintiffs had, after execution of the contract, considered the imp-rovements sp·ecified in the contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to be undesirable and had \Yaived the provisions of
the contract with respect thereto.
The defendants further alleged that sinee the date
of the contract, they had made 49 pa)i1nents on the
contract aggregating $1647.67, and that on the 21st
day of November, 1939 the parties had made a con1putation of all payments which had then 1nature<l
and all charges of every character and had determined that there wa.s due on back interest and
taxes, including the 1938 taxes, and on lumber purchased and used in making improvements upon the
said building, the sum of $485.82 and that defendants had delivered to the plaintiff their negotiable
promis8ory note for the said sum, payable in installments of $35 per month.
It is further alleged in the answer, that on the 31st
day of March, 1940, the defendants paid to the
plaintiffs the sum of $80 on the contract and beforP.
the institution of suit they tendered to plaintiffs
the total amount due upon the contract, exciusivo
of the said note, to wit: $130. That they have kept
said tender good and rio"' offer to make the payments on the contract to the clerk of the court and
to fully comply 'vith the terms·· -and conditions
thereof. ~\11 other n1aterial allegations of the con1plaint are denied.
The case was tried before a jury, evidence was
adduced by the plaintiffs and defendants as to the
payments made, as to the circumstances surround-.
ing the execution and delivery of the promissory
·note, Exhibit 2, dated November 21, 1939, and as
to the improvements referred to in the eontract.
The evidence was in conflict as to the waiver of the
contraet requirements regarding the building of
the front porch and stuccoing of the rear. The
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defendants offered proof to the effect that they
had, since the execution of the contract, improved
the property to the extent of $2,000. An objection
to this offer 'vas sustained by the court.
When both parties rested, the plaintiffs moved to
strike all of the testimony of the defendants relat·
ing to the waiver of the requirements in the con·
tract for the construction of a front porch and the
stuccoing of the rear of the building, and moved
the court to direct the jury to find in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants as prayed in
the complaint.
·
After hearing argument on the motion, the court
stated that he would direct a verdict for the plain·
tiffs, but that he would give the defendants an
opportunity to protect their investment by paying
the full balance on the contract, together ""with $300
attorney's fees, and court costs, which would not
1exceed $35. (Ab. 28-30).
The court stated that he would hold up the entry of
any judgment for a p.eriod of one week, if the de·
fendants agreed during that period, to attemp~t to
get the money. During the ensuing week, a.s shown
by the colloquy between court and counsel, the defendants endeavored to raise the necessary money
but fell short of getting the required amount. The
court thereupon granted the plaintiffs' motion to
Etrike all testimony respecting the agreement to the
effect that the front porch need not he constructed
nor the back porch repaired by the application of
stucco and granted the plaintiffs' motion for a
directed verdict. (Ab. 32), ·
A judgment "ras entered on the verdict, providing
for the recovery of the possession of the real estate
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5.
and th(l recovery of $-t-1~.50, representing treble
damages. (Ab. 34-35).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendants assigned as error the sustaining of
objections to the following question:
''About ho'v much money did you spend on
making the improvements on the inside~''
and in sustaining objections to the following question:

"I will ask you to state whether or not an
offer to make ace-ruing installment payInents on the contract 'vas made, and if so,
\\?hat the offer was~''
·rhe court erred in making and entering an order '
striking all evidence from the record relating to
the modification of the contract by oral agreement
and conduct. .(I, III).
The court erred in directing the jury to return a
verdict for the plaintiffs. (I\T, VI).
The court erred in l.mposing a condition on the de .
fendants that they pay in addition to the amount
due on the contract, $300 attorney's fees and court
costs not exceeding $35, and in limiting the time
in which the defendants were required to make
such payments. (V).
'rhe court erred in considering the equitable issues
and in holding as a matter of law that the notice
of forfeiture "\Vas reasonable and sufficient. (VIII,

IX).
The court erred in making and enterin2' Judgment.
(\

7

II, X,

XI)~
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ARGUMENT
'rhe assignments of error will he argued under the
following headings :
1. The/ court erred in directing a verdict
for the phiintiffs and in making and entering judgment thereon. (Assign. 4, 6, 7, 9,
10 and 11).
2. The court erred in ruling on the evidence. (Assign. 1-3).
3. The court erred in failing and refusing
to consider equitable issues. (Assign. 5
and 8).

The pleadings disclose issues upon the following
questions:
The amount delinquent on the contract when suit was brought;
(1)

( 2:) Whether the contract provisiOIIls
which required the defendants to make
improvements had been waived;
( 3) Whether the contract ;J,s modified had
been substantially performed by the defendants;
( 4) Whether strict p~erformance of the
contract by the defendants had been
waived:
(5) Whether the notice, Exhibit A, was
sufficient to terminate the contract, and
( 6) Whether in equity the court should
declare a forfeiture of a contract for tne
purchase of a house and lot upon which
more than one-third of the principal amount
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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h~1s

been paid and \Yhere $2,000 in valuable
ilnproYenH:>nts have been placed on the
property.

Some of the issues were undoubtedy legal issues
\Yhich should haYe been submitted to the jury and
some were equitable issues for the deterrnination
of the court. 1.'his action is for the recovery of
specific real property with damages, and falls
squarely "~i thin the provisions of
Section 104-23-5 of the R-evised Statutes of
lTtah, 193~.
l t provides ~

"In actions for the recovery of specific real
or personal property, writh or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon
contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may
be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is .
waived or a referenee is ordered as provided in this code. Where in these cases
there are issues both of la"r and fact, the
issue of law must first be disposed of. In
other cases issues of fact must be tried by
the court, subject to its power to order any
such issue to be tried by a jury or referred
to a referee as provided in this code.''
It has been held by this Court that where a case
involves both lPgal and equitable issues, the ·court
should decide the equitable issues and submit the
questions of f9.ct to the jury.

Park v. Wilkinson, 21 Utah 279; 60 P. 945.
It is well settled that '\vhere there is substantia.]
evidence both 'vays on a material question of fact,
it is error for the trial court to direct a. verdict
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Iverson v. Carrington, 60 Utah 79; 206 P.
707.
2 Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies,
Section 1442, p. 1908 et seq.
For the purpose of arguing the error of the court
in directing a verdict for the plaintiffs, let us for
the time being disregard the equitable issues. To
make a case, the plaintiffs must show a default by
the purchasers for which the contract could, under
its terms, be forfeited. The defaults relied upon
are set out in the notice, Exhibit A, which is by
reference, made a part of the con1plaint. They are:
Failure to pay monthly p·ayment~
totalling $130.
( 2) Failure to pay taxes and Insurance
. totalling $297.20.
(3) Failure to make specified imp-rovements.
(1)

Since the suit is based upon these
questions as to 'vhether defendants
the defaults charged were material.
cuss the evidence as to these items
mentioned.

defaults, the
are guilty of
We shall dis·
in the order

The evidence disclosed that $130 ,~vas tendered to
the plaintiffs May 20, 1940. (Ab. 19-~0). rl'he
notice does not call for payment of additional in·
stallments. The defendants offered to pay all in·
stallment payments called for by the notice before
suit 'vas brought. They testified further that the:y
made a payment of $80 on March 31, 1940. Ot.her
payments made after January, 1940, "\\Tere as fol
lows:·
$70.00 payment on the note February 14,
1940, (Ex. 3) ; $88.15, February 14, 1940,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(_Ex. E); $19.00 ~,ebtuary, 1940, (-.:\.b. 17 ~
l~), and $40.00 Thlarch, 1940, (Ah. 17).
1\Irs. Christy tPstified that if another payment ot
some $~5 \Yas made earlier in l\_l arch in Salt Lake
City, it \Vould be on the contract.

The application of payments upon specific months
is not made on the contract. From the beginning,
it will be noted by exa1nination of Exhibit 1, pa.ylnents made at irregular intervals, were credited
upon the total purchase price. So, under the evi·
dence, there is no support for the contention of the
plaintiffs that the delinquencies covered the months
from December to April. They did not. rrhe
alleged delinquencies of $130 covered the en tire
period from the date of the contract, Jan~ary 24,
1935, to :i\Iarch 31, 1940. As observed above, the
'last payment of $80 was made on March 31, 1940.
It is well settled that the acceptance of late and
irregular payments on a real estate contract, which
provides for monthly installment payments, vvaives
the provision in the contract to the effect that
time is of the essence and waives the right of the
sellers to forfeit the contract without a timely and
reasona bl0 notice.
Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417; 34 P. (2d)
699.
What is a timely and reasonable notice is a ques·
tion of fact fnr the jury.
66 C. J. 724, Note 87.
\V-illiarnson Heater Co. v. Whitmer, 183
N. W. 404; 191 Iowa 1115.

By accepting the $80 payment on March 31, 1940,
the sellers waived the right to terminate the contract for failure to pay the March payinent ·of $30
and the April 1st p·ayment -of $30, there being no
agreement as to whether the $80 payment was to
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cover old delinquencies on the contract or current
monthly payments. $80 would pay for two and
two-thirds mo:Qths. 'rhe notice of forfeiture was
served before the May payment fell due. The
question of intent of the p·arties as to application
of payments was one for the jury.
The second issue, the delinquent taxes and insurance, involves the note, Exhibit 2. Although it
\vas at first hotly denied by Mrs. Christy, one
of the plaintiffs, that the note had anything to do
'vith the contract of purchase, it was finally admitted that the notations in ink on page 2 of the
note covered the delinquent taxes and insurance
and other items and that they were placed on the
note before it wa~ signed and delivered. (Ab. 14) .
. ~1\lthough the note states that it was for money
·uoaned, and that it has no eonnection with the contract of purchase, the notations on both the first
and second pages clearly indicate the contrary and
they are obviously part of the agreement. The
evide-nce shows payments which were appliPd on
the note. Mr. Guild testified that he had paid
approximately $95 on the note. (Ab~ 20).
The evidence is in conflict as to whether the notP
\vas given and accepted as payment of the de.
Jinquent taxes and insurance. If the note was givev
as payment of the delinquent ta..-xes and insurance.
there was no default under the contract and thf'
court erred in directing a verdict for failure to pay
the items of delinquent taxes and insurance when
due. The question as to 'vhether the note was given
, ~as payment of an installment or as additional security was a question for the jury.
Rathke v. Dexter Horton Bank, 161 Wash.
434. 297 P. 181.
-

'

If the note was not given in payment it was cei·
tainly a written modification of the contract as to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the time of payn1ent of the delinquent taxes and insurance. The contract contained no provision to
the effect that if the $35 monthly installment pay·
ments were not 1nade "Then due, that the holder of
the note, whoever it might be, could declare a rorfeiture of the real estate contract. In the case of
Spedden v. Sykes, 98 P. 752, 754,
the Court said:
''But "rhere, not only under the contract,
but by subsequent agreen1ent of the parties, notes are given for the payment of
the purchase price \vhich, in the absence
of any agreement to the contrary, would
extend the time of payment over the period
of limitation fixed by the statute for recovery upon overdue contracts, thus eliminating the implication or express understanding, as the case may be, that time is
the essence of the contract, a more difficult
question is p~resented, for it is upon this
theory that forfeitures are sustained. 1
Pomeroy's Equity, Para.. 445; Clark v.
Lyons, 24 Ill. 105; Shater v. Niver, 9 Mich.
253; Linscott v. Buck, 33 Me. 530 . . . ''
''This Court has held the g eneral doctrine
that forfeitures are not favored in the law,
and that courts should promptly seize upon
any circun18tance arising out of the contract or relations of the parties that would
indicate an election or an agreement to
waive the harsh and at times unjust remedy
of forfeiture, a remedy which is oftentimes
too freely granted by those who have taken
no account of the misfortunes and disappointments 'vhich conditions, unforseen
1
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and beyond a party's control, have raised
as a bar to performance, however honest
may he his intent. Whiting v. D-oughton,
31 Wash. 327; 71 P. 1026. Equity will enforce forfeitures when it is the contract of
the parties that it shall be so. But before
rnaking its decree it will consider every
agreement, every declaration, and every relation of the parties arising out of the contract ; and, if there be anything that warrants a finding that the p~arties have resolved anew, it will so decree.''
It was error for the court to refuse to submit to
the jury the issue of fact as to the intention of the
parties with respect to the note, Exhibit 2.
Another issue of fact, which should have been submitted to the jury, concerns the alleged default in
making the improvements. There is testimony by
both Mr. and Mrs. Guild that the plaintiffs knew
that the front porch had not been built and the back
porch stuccoed, over a period of several years, and
that Mr. Christy, in the presence of Mrs. Christy
had agreed that it was not the style to put front
porches on apartment houses and had '' s.anctioned''
the placing of lumber on the back porch in lieu of
stucco. (Mr. Guild, Tr. 110-117; Ab. 16-17). (Mrs.
Guild, Tr. 136-138 ; A b. 21). This was denied by
Mrs. Christy. (Tr. 167; Ab. 25-26).
A· plasterer, Parley Powe,ll, testified that about

one year ago, he had given Mr. Guild an estimate
on the stuccoing job. (Ab. 22). Here was a substantial issue of fact on a material matter - one
of the alleged defaults upon which a. claim of forfeiture was based. It is well· settled that a requirement of a written contract may be orally waived.
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The Supren1e Court of Utah held in the case of
Hogan Y. s"~ayze, 65 Utah 380; 23'7 P. 1097,
that a written contract required under the statute
of frauds to be in "~riting may be n1odified and
specific provisions 'Yaived by oral agreen1ent. This
case is directly in point, both on the facts and the
law. See cases from other jurisdictions collected:
66 C. J.

7~6,

Note 25.

The appellants assigned as error the order of the
trial cour~ sustaining objections to the question:
''_._-\bout ho,,~ rnuch money did you spend
on making the improvements on the inf?jd?? ,,

The court also sustained objections to the following question:
''I will ask you to state whether or not an
offer to make accruing installment payments on the contract was made, and if so,
what the offer was~" (Assign. I, II).
The trial court failed to consider equitable issues
presented by the pleadings, and the rulings complained of were consistent with that position. Tlie
Supreme Court of Utah has held that in actions for
the forfeiture of a real estate contract, the ·court
should determine \\'hether, upon the forfeiture of
a ·contract, it will impose a penalty. If, under the
circumstances of the p·articular case, the forfeiture
results in a penalty, it has been held the forfeiture
provisions would not be enforced.
Croft v. Jensen, 86 lJtah 13; 40 P.

19.11)

198
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In this ·ca.se if forfeiture of the: contract is per·
mitted it will impose a penalty. The sellers 11ut
only got more than one-third of the principal and
all the interest, but were enriched by the improvements.
·rhe defendants offered to prove that the house haq
been remodeled on the inside and that the reasonable value of the improvements was $2,0~. The
evidence shows that payments aggregating $1647.67
had been made. Thus the plaintiffs had put into
the property $3647.67 in improvements and in
money. paid. Of the money paid, approximately
$1153.00 ~vas credited to principal. The total purehase price of the property 'vas $3200. The trial
court ignored these facts. It declared a forfeiture
for failure to p-ay a single monthly payment. The
evidence shows under the plaintiffs' theory only
$160 was due ·on the installments on the contract
on the date the notice of forfeiture 'vas served.
The notice called for only $130, and not any a.ccru·
ing installments, and accordingly, $130 w~s tendered. The note, Exhibit 2, provided for monthly
payments of $35 per month, commencing on the
] 2th day of December, 1939. Ed,vard L. Guild testified that he paid $95 on the note, Exhibit 2. This
would have paid the December payment, the Jan·
nary payment, and $25 on the February payment.
There is no provision in the note to the effect that
upon default the real estate contract may be forfeited. Even if the-re had been such an agreement
H t the time the notice vvas served, there 'vas only
one full payment, (Ap·ril 12) and $10 on the ~larch
payment due. Certainly a court of equity should
not direct the forfeiture nf a contract upon which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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more~

than one-third of the princip1al had been paid
and ,,..here $2000 in improven1ents had been n1ade,
for such slig-ht defaults.
The California case of
·\Yebber v. Herbert, 46 Cal. ...~pp. 8±; 188
P. 819,
is closely in point. In that case the purchasers had
paid $2000 of a $4000 purchase price and they thereafte·r became delinquent in the payment of interest. The sellers promptly took advantage of the
default and declared a forfeiture. The trial court
ruled that because of equitable considerations the
forfeiture could not be claimed and the Appellate
Court not only sustained the trial court, but ordered
the appel~ants to pay to the respondents the sum
oi $:2~0 as a penalty for a frivolous appeal. The
.Court said:
"Such a sillt is addressed to the equitable
powers of the court. Equity has always
looked .with marked abhorrence upon forfeitures, and it has been said many iimes
that any unquestioned evidence of sharp
practices and over-reaching is sufficient to
defeat a complainant in equity who has
been guilty of such practices. Neither serious consideration nor citation of authority
is necessary to support the conclusion that
no party to a contract can insist on thPperformance of a current condition, such as
the payment of taxes, and thereafter repudiate the contract for a prior breach of
'vhich he must have kno,vn. . A court of
equity doPs not permit parties 'vho seek
j t,.:: nid thus to blo'v hot and cold. Neither
mny a sel1cr for years disregard ~ -provision
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making time of the essence of a contract,
litte by little getting half the value of his
land, and then, without notice to the buyer
who has been lulled to a false sense of
seeurity, enforce a forfeiture for a trifling
delay in the payment of interest. (Cases
eited).''
The only sign of equitable consideration given by
the court may be found in the court's staten1ent
on pages 28 to 30 of the abstract. The court said
that if the defendants would pay the total amount
due on the contract and in addition, $300 attorney's
fees, and $35 in .costs, within one week's time, he
would hold up the entry of a judgment.
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that in ac·
tions of this kind th(\ ~ellRrs cannot recover an
attorney's fee.
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137; 292 P. 206.
Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417; 34 P. (2d)
699.
Yet the trial court not· only refused to let the purchasers pay up the defaults or even the entire balance due on the contract, but added a penalty of
$300 attorney's fees. Under the present business
conditions such a proposal could not be ·complied
'vith in the time given. It was stated to the court
that the defendants had been able to raise all but
''maybe a hundred or $200 of the amount due.';
But the court nevertheless directed a verdict for
the plaintiffs and entered a judgment for restitution of the premises and for treble da1nages, which
aggregated $412.50. Thus, although the documenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ta.ry eYidence sho"·s that the defendants _paid n1ore
than OIH:•-third of the principal an1ount dtte on a
$3200 purehase price, and the defendants offered to
proYe that an old building had been turned into an
apartment house at the cost of $2000, thus putting
the property in a condition where it 'vould net
$75 a month, the ·court entered a j·udgment for
$412.50 damages. This loss of the payment and
investment, 'Yas an unjust and unconscionable p~en
alty imposed upon the defendants.
lt is respectft~lly submitted that the judgment should
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted.

J.D. SKEEN,
E. J. SKEEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.
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